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Overview

Promises Kept, Promises Broken, Promises
Deferred: The Americans with Disabilities Act
by Robert D. Dinerstein
Twenty-ﬁve years ago this coming July,
Congress, by wide margins, passed the
landmark Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA). Congress stated its
purpose, in part, as:
(1) To provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities;
(2) To provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;
 5PFOTVSFUIBUUIF'FEFSBM(PWFSOment plays a central role in enforcing
the standards Established in this Act
on behalf of individuals with disabilities . . . (ADA §12101(b)).

Has this ringing mandate been
met for people with intellectual
and developmental disabilities?
The answer must be: Yes, No,
and To Be Determined.

Buttressed by a set of robust ﬁndings
that emphasized the pervasive nature
of discrimination against people with
disabilities in “such critical areas as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access
to public services,” the ADA purported
to address discrimination in virtually all
areas of the lives of people with disabilities (ADA, §12101(a)(3)).
Has this ringing mandate been met for
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD)? The answer must

be: Yes, No, and To Be Determined. Or,
if one prefers, promises kept, promises
broken, and promises deferred.

Promises Kept
The ADA has served an important symbolic function in raising the consciousness of the broader society regarding the
rights of people with disabilities. Though
one could argue that this consciousnessraising relates more to people with physical disabilities than mental disabilities, as
reﬂected in the ubiquitous ﬁgure of the
person in a wheelchair, it is undeniably
true that many people without disabilities have a greater appreciation for the
contributions to society that people with
IDD make and the discrimination that
they have experienced. This symbolic
function is not to be gainsaid, even if it is
difﬁcult to quantify. Ironically, the very
success of the ADA has been used by
some politicians to argue against ratiﬁcation of the United Nations Convention
POUIF3JHIUTPG1FSTPOTXJUI%JTBCJMJUJFT
as unnecessary because “we already have
the ADA.” The ADA is now part of the
public rights discourse in the same way
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title
IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 are for racial minorities and women
&OHFM.VOHFS  
The ADA is more than a symbol, however. Critical cases such as the Supreme
Court case of Olmstead v. L.C. have been
instrumental (eventually, at least) in
encouraging the trend of deinstitutionalizing people with IDD and keeping them
out of institutions altogether. Other cases,
though not speciﬁcally about people
with IDD, have increased access to public
accommodations by people with disabilities (Bragdon v. Abbott – people who are
HIV+), limited the reach of the “fundamental alteration” defense by places of
public accommodation (PGA v. Martin),
and recognized that Title II of the ADA

is a legitimate exercise of congressional
power when addressing fundamental
issues such as access to courts (Tennessee v. Lane). .BOZMPXFSDPVSUDBTFT
have addressed important issues such
as access to the Internet, the viability of
sheltered workshops, disability-based
harassment, and other matters. And in
BEEJUJPOUPDPVSUDBTFT UIF'FEFSBM(PWernment, primarily the U.S. Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, has
been active in promulgating regulations
and bringing (and often settling) major
litigation that has vindicated the rights
of people with disabilities.

Promises Broken
But in other respects the ADA has not
delivered on its promise. Supreme Court
decisions that severely constricted the
JOUFSQSFUBUJPOPG UIFTUBUVUF¦Sutton v.
United Airlines and its two companion
cases, as well as Toyota Manufacturing Co.
of Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, and Board
of Trustees v. Garrett UPOBNFTFWFSBM¦
limited the reach of the ADA, especially
in the employment area. The Sutton trilogy and Toyota case established an insidious environment in which individuals
with disabilities, including people with
IDD, could not meet the threshold deﬁnition of being a qualiﬁed individual
XJUIBEJTBCJMJUZ¦UIBUJT BOJOEJWJEVBM
with a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limited a major life
BDUJWJUZ¦BOEIFODFDPVMEOPUFWFOSBJTF
a claim of substantive discrimination,
let alone prevail. For those who could
overcome this hurdle, the difﬁculty of
demonstrating a level of impairment that
would rise to the level of seriousness that
the Supreme Court required while then
proving that the individual could perform
the essential functions of the job, with
or without reasonable accommodations,
created a Catch-22 situation that made
it difﬁcult to demonstrate substantive
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discrimination. In Garrett, the Supreme
Court used its 1985 equal protection
decision in City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., (in which
the Court concluded that classiﬁcations
based on intellectual disability were not
entitled to heightened review, but only
rational basis review) to rule that Title
I of the ADA was unconstitutional on
grounds of sovereign immunity insofar
as it purported to authorize private
damage actions against State employers
because it did not clearly demonstrate
that the provisions of the ADA, or the
legislative history underlying it, attacked
irrational State employment discrimination. The result was that the ADA
wound up providing a lot less protection
for people with disabilities than people
with disabilities, advocates, academics,
and even individual Senators and Congress members themselves, expected.
A 2007 case from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding a person with an intellectual disability, Littleton v. Wal-Mart, reﬂected the absurdity of the jurisprudence in this area.
In that case, the appellate court afﬁrmed
a lower-court order granting summary
KVEHNFOUUP8BM.BSU DPODMVEJOHUIBU
Littleton had not demonstrated that his
intellectual disability constituted a mental impairment that substantially limited
a major life activity. Littleton argued that
his intellectual disability substantially
limited him in such major life activities as
learning, thinking, communicating, and
social interaction (as well as working). In
rejecting his argument, the court determined that Littleton’s abilities to drive a
car, to be interviewed alone for a job, and
to interact verbally with co-workers negated a ﬁnding that he was substantially
limited in any of these life activities. By
deﬁnition, anyone with an intellectual
disability, even in its mildest form, is
within the bottom 3% of the population
in terms of intellectual functioning. The
court’s lack of understanding about
what people with intellectual disabilities
can do led it to conclude that the above
abilities were inconsistent with a determination that Littleton’s ability to think
and learn was substantially limited. The

court’s conclusion that “we do not doubt
that Littleton has certain limitations
because of his mental retardation”
seems damning with faint praise.
The Supreme Court’s only ADA case
dealing with people with IDD was Olmstead. But other cases presented interpretations of the statute that could bode
ill for people with IDD. For example,
in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, the
Court held that the statutory defense
of “direct threat to others” did not preclude an employer from arguing that
an employee should be ﬁred because, in
its judgment, exposure to toxins would
constitute a “direct threat to self.” This
paternalistic judgment was precisely the
kind of judgment that Congress had in
mind when it noted that “individuals
with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, including. . . overprotective rules and policies”
(ADA, 42 USC §12101 (a)(5)). In U.S.
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Court, in a
somewhat fractured opinion, held that
the existence of an employer’s seniority
system would in most cases trump the
ADA requirement that a worker with a
disability be assigned to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation if
the worker no longer could perform his
or her original job with or without an
accommodation. These cases, and those
mentioned earlier, create particular barriers for employment of people with disabilities, including those with IDD.

Promises Deferred
In the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),
Congress attempted to right the ship of
ADA interpretation and return Title I
of the ADA to its original meaning. It
speciﬁcally overruled the Sutton and
Toyota cases as having been unfaithful to
congressional intent in the original ADA
by having established a too-demanding
test for the threshold determination
of disability. Among other things, the
ADAAA makes it clear that the Court
and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) had adopted a toostringent interpretation of “substantial

limitation,” adding that the threshold
determination of disability should no
longer be a demanding one. The ADAAA
deﬁnes major life activities in the statute
itself; adds operation of a major bodily
function to the list of major life activities; clariﬁes that the limitation imposed
by the physical or mental impairment
should be assessed without consideration
of so-called mitigating measures that
might ameliorate the effects of the condition; and reinvigorates the deﬁnitional
prong of “regarded as” having a disability
by removing any requirement that the
impairment that forms the basis of the
perceived disability actually limit a major
life activity. Although it is still relatively
early, for the most part it appears that
lower courts are heeding the ADAAA
statutory language and reaching the merits of employment discrimination claims.
Case results are mixed, as one would expect, but at least courts are adjudicating
claims on their substantive merits.
The deferred promise of the ADA
is not merely the result of it being too
early to determine if the ADAAA will be
effective. In other respects, the promise
NBZCFEFGFSSFE¦PSBUMFBTUSFEF²OFE¦
not because of what the ADA or ADAAA
purport to do, but because some of the
expectations that some had for the ADA
may not have been reasonable. That is,
although many have expressed disappointment that the level of employment of people with disabilities has not
increased signiﬁcantly since the enactNFOUPG UIF"%"¦BOEBDDPSEJOHUP
TPNF IBTBDUVBMMZEFDSFBTFE¦JUIBSEMZ
seems reasonable to blame this fact on
the ADA. The reasons for un- and underemployment of people with disabilities
(especially, people with IDD) are complex and multi-factored. Over-use of
sheltered workshops, educational shortfalls, transportation difﬁculties, and
under-funded supported employment
programs are just some of the reasons
that unemployment has remained high.
.PSFPWFS EJTDSJNJOBUJPO FTQFDJBMMZJO
hiring, is increasingly difﬁcult to prove,
whether it is based on disability, race or
gender. But at least plaintiffs can now
have their day in court.
[Dinerstein, continued on page 35]
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Continuation

from other cultures, it changed with the
current wars. Now we have people who
fought to save our country coming back
from war with disabilities and we have
to think about them. I think in the future
we’ll go back to Washington and we are
going to re-tweak the ADA to ﬁt what’s
going on right now with housing, technology, transportation, health care, science, all the different people from around
the world who come to the United States,
the veterans from the war, and people
who are aging.
So we have to move our ideas, thoughts,
and ﬁghting techniques toward making a
better community for all. The ADA has to
work for all different kinds of people.
Heidi Myhre can be reached by e-mail at
worldcommunity@comcast.net.
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[Jamieson, continued from page 19]
[Dinerstein, continued from page 7]

Conclusion
We would do well to remember that
some of the major issues facing people
XJUI*%%¦TVDIBTQSPCMFNTXJUIPWFSuse of guardianships and other forms of
intervention that fail to recognize their
DBQBDJUZ¦NBZCFNPSFBGVODUJPOPG 
state than federal law (though there are
some creative arguments for applying
the ADA to guardianship, for example)
(Salzman, 2010). Even if the ADA were
perfectly enforced, people with IDD
would still experience stigma and would
still face challenges in integrating fully
JOUPTPDJFUZ1FPQMFXJUI*%%BSFCFUUFS
off because of the passage of the ADA.
But it is up to them and their advocates
to continue to ﬁght for judicial interpretations and executive action that will
give full meaning to the lofty promises
that Congress made 25 years ago.
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an afﬁrmative responsibility to provide
community alternatives.
.ZGBWPSJUFQBSUPG UIFEFDJTJPOJTUIF
Court’s powerful analysis of why isolation is discriminatory:
6OKVTUJ²FEJTPMBUJPOJTQSPQFSMZ
regarded as discrimination based on
disability.
 *OTUJUVUJPOBMQMBDFNFOUPG BQFSTPO
who can handle and beneﬁt from
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons
so isolated are incapable or unworthy
of participating in community life.
 $PO²OFNFOUJOBOJOTUJUVUJPOTFverely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including
family relations, social contacts, work
options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.
[Olmstead v. L.C. 1999, p. 600-601].
Thus, under Olmstead, unnecessary institutional segregation is discrimination and
lack of community supports is no excuse.
Before concluding, I want to remind
everyone that things have improved since
Olmstead, partly in response to the case,
but mostly in response to the determination of advocates in the years since the

decision. Now we can look at crumbling
massive State institutions and say, what
were we thinking? But we can still look
around any state in the country and see
segregation in community programs,
nursing homes, schools, detention centers, and the list goes on. There is, in
other words, much work to be done.

Conclusion
In closing, I want to explain that our
Supreme Court adventure was never
imagined. We were thrilled but also terriﬁed when the Court granted Cert at
the State’s request. Happily, that is when
the entire national community of civil
rights advocates rallied round our legal
aid program. This ad hoc coalition of
amici and grassroots organizations in
every state working together convinced
the Supreme Court that Lois and Elaine
should not be institutionalized, that
they deserved the opportunity to live in
neighborhoods and communities like
anyone else. If the public system needs
improving or expanding then the State
needs to get busy because a lack of alternatives does not excuse discrimination.
Ultimately, back at legal aid, we
learned that freedom from segregation
is not measured by one case. Instead,
the case is part of a complex, heroic
fabric woven by the efforts of those who
went before and those who continue the
struggle now.
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